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THE MERGING CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY
AND EQUALITY
RICHARD B. WILSON*
Liberty and equality have frequently been considered antithetic.
Liberty has been viewed as protecting the unfettered expression of
individuality in all its forms, equality as a set of limitations on human
action. R. H. Tawney observes that: "Equality implies the deliberate
acceptance of social restraints on individual expansion. If liberty
means, therefore, that every individual shall be free to indulge
without limit his appetite (for wealth and power), it is clearly incom-
patible not only with economic and social, but with civil and political,
equality."
The pervasive influence of this dichotomy on the development
of American political thought is underscored by William Graham
Sumner's observation that ". we cannot go outside this alternative:
liberty, inequality, survival of the fittest; non-liberty, equality, survival
of the unfittest." 2 Heightened by philosophies of individualism and
competitive economics on the one hand and by periodic waves of
egalitarian and leveling tendencies on the other, the conflict between
liberty and equality has been a continually recurrent theme in Amer-
ican ideological history. Adverting to the dominant role of equality
in the Declaration of Independence and to the disproportionate weight
given individualism in the Constitution, Parrington notes that the
"unlikeness (of these two documents) is unmistakable; the one a clas-
sical statement of French humanitarian democracy, the other an or-
ganic law designed to safeguard the minority under republican rule."
3
Finally, the diversity of liberty and equality has been confirmed by the
clash between security and opportunity. "When opportunity became
bounded in the last generation," writes Myrdahl, "the inherent con-
flict between liberty and equality flared up."
'4
Side by side with this idea of competition and contrast between
liberty and equality there has developed the notion that they are
similar or identical. Each was viewed by the framers of the Declara-
tion of Independence as containing an irreducible and inalienable
*Assistant Professor, University of California, Berkeley, California.
1Tawney, Equality (1931) 238.
2Sumner, The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays (Keller ed. 1914) 25.
3lI Parrington, Marn Currents in American Thought (193o) 41i.
'Myrdahl, An American Dilemma (1944) 9.
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core. Moreover, it is now clear that the phrases embodying these con-
cepts in the Fourteenth Amendment-the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses-were both originally intended by their abolitionist
formulators to project certain natural and inalienable rights.5 In-
deed, one abolitionist architect of the Amendment, Rep. John A.
Bingham, used the phrases "due process of law" and "equal pro-
tection of the laws" interchangeably. 6 Eighty years of judicial con-
struction has failed to erase completely this common substantive con-
tent. In certain respects men have been said to have an absolute right to
equality before the law and certain classifying traits have been
rendered constitutionally suspect. Speaking for a unanimous court
in Hernandez v. Texas, Chief Justice Warren remarked that "it is a
denial of the equal protection of the laws to try a defendant of a par-
ticular race or color under an indictment issued by a grand jury, or
before a petit jury, from which all persons of his race or color have,
solely because of that race or color, been excluded by the State .... ,,7
Neither the similarities nor the distinctions between liberty and
equality have been developed systematically. Each has on occasion
functioned as an alternate for the other, and no superior doctrine has
been developed for determining the types of situations to which each
is applicable. In the postwar period, particularly, federal decisions
reveal an accelerating tendency to construe constitutional liberties
in terms of equal protection formulae.8 The conflict between con-
vergent and divergent theories about the relationship of liberty
and equality has contributed signally to our current confusion over the
nature of individual freedom and the proper relationship between
man and the state.
Liberty and equality have been shaped and refined constitutionally
by a philosophy of minimum government. Within this context
they have tended to diverge. It is highly probable that their future
constitutional development will be reshaped by expanding govern-
ment controls over ever-widening areas of individual activity. Within
this context they will probably coalesce, providing a unified doctrine
as our dominant ideal and constitutional demand. Moreover, the
disappearance of geographical, economic, and social frontiers has
intensified collision and conflict among individuals and between so-
rten Broek, The Anti-Slavery Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment (1951)
198-2oo.
OCongressional Globe, 39th Cong., lst Sess. io88.
MHernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477 (1954).
8Infra, at 16 through S8.
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cial groups. Consequently, invasion of individual liberty by private
action is becoming an equal, if not greater threat, to the fabric of
freedom than invasion by government action. To control these pri-
vate invasions and to maximize liberty, government must be as con-
cerned with equality of regulation and similarity of treatment as
it is with the preservation of certain negative freedoms.9 The result
promises a further merging of the doctrines of liberty and equality.
Existing confusion over the proper relationship of the two con-
cepts, when coupled with their emerging and potentially increasing
convergence, provides compelling argument for a re-exploration of
the constitutional status of liberty and equality. What do recent fed-
eral decisions tell us about the roles played by liberty and equality in
the numerous constitutional sections which embody them? To what
extent and in what manner has there been an intermingling of the two
concepts and of their attendant interpretive doctrines? What are the
consequences of this intermingling for the future of self-government?
I. Equal Protection
The demand for equal protection of the laws has been assigned,
in the language of the Court, to numerous constitutional sections.' 0
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth" and Fourteenth Amendments,
12
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
13
the Commerce Clause,14 and the First Amendment' 5-all have been
said to require some measure of equal treatment for those similarly
situated.
While the concept of equality developed in some of these areas
Infra, at 0S.
'-See Antieau, Equal Protection Outside the Clause (1952) 40 Calif. L. Rev. 362-
377.
1 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U. S. 214 (1944); Steward Machine Comp. v. Davis, 3ol U. S. 548 (1937); Truax
v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 (1921).
"Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U. S. 50 (1951); Cassell v. Texas, 399 U. S. 282 (1950);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 51o (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 263 U. S. 39o
(1922); Richmond v. Deans, 281 U. S. 704 (1930); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60
(1917).
"Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404 (1935); Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496 (1939);
concurring opinion in Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. x6o (1941).
14 Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1875); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313
(18go); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 (1946); Dean Milk Comp. v. City of
Madison, 340 U. S. 349 (1951).
"5Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496 (1939); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516
(1945); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345
U. S. 395 (1953); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250 (1952).
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will be explored more adequately below, it is to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that we must turn initially
for a clear view of the contemporary constitutional doctrine of equality.
Ideally and abstractly, equality requires that excessive differences
in wealth and power be prohibited, that all persons have equal access
to the mainstreams of opportunity, and that all enjoy identical sub-
stantive rights. Achievement of this ideal would require the fulfillment
of at least three conditions, none of which we have seen fit to meet
completely. (i) Since men differ in energy, ability, and resources,
positive public action is necessary to provide the material requirements
for near or exact similarity of condition. Social security programs,
agricultural and business subsidies, government credit facilities, pub-
licly-owned enterprises-while highly selective, frequently inadequate,
and usually motivated by pressure-group interest rather than by an
egalitarian ideal-all point toward a constitutional demand for simi-
larity of status and equality of opportunity. (2) Regulatory action
is necessary to create and maintain equality of condition and oppor-
tunity against those inequities produced by the clash of private in-
terests. Police power protections against monopolies, adulterated or
unhealthful products, unscrupulous and incompetent professional
practitioners, unfair labor practices, unfair competition, etc.-all
represent a partial fulfillment of this demand. Other private discrim-
inations, as those perpetrated on the basis of race, color, or creed,
have only recently and partially been prohibited under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a clause intended
by its formulators to abolish completely private discrimination and
to guarantee fully the equal enjoyment of all substantive rights.16 The
emergence of an embryonic doctrine of "substantive" equality may
presage a significant expansion of equality in the enjoyment of basic
rights. (3) Since government action defines and regulates in large part
the relationship between citizens, government must itself refrain from
creating and maintaining inequalities. It is to this third condition that
the Equal Protection Clause has been primarily directed. Here, two
doctrines have predominated: the requirement of reasonable classifica-
tion and the prohibition on discriminatory motive. A more detailed
statement of these doctrines and of the concept of substantive equal
protection should bring into sharper focus the present boundaries of
the Equal Protection Clause.
"~ten Broek, supra, note 5 at 221-222.
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A. Reasonable Classification
Since the Fourteenth Amendment "does not require things which
are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they
were the same,"1 7 some measure of discrimination is constitutionally
tolerable. Discrimination is tolerable if it rests upon a reasonable
classification. When legislatures define a limited class of persons and
apply to the members of that class a unique or special treatment, the
courts have usually demanded that all persons within the class be
treated in the same manner,' 8 and that the classification itself be
reasonably related to the accomplishment of some valid public pur-
pose.19 While the first of these requirements has presented relatively
few problems, the second raises two definitional questions: what is a
reasonable relationship, and what is a valid public purpose? No com-
plete nor satisfactory answers have been given to either of these queries.
Setting aside temporarily the "purpose" issue,20 an ideally reason-
able classification would mean that all persons included in the class
slated for special treatment and only those persons, possess the charac-
teristics which the legislature has undertaken to promote, to regulate,
or to eliminate. If government decides to remove all potential sabo-
teurs from the vicinity of defense installations, for example, the de-
mand for reasonable classification requires that no potential sato-
teurs be omitted from the exclusion order and that no persons lacking
the characteristic of potential sabotage be included in the order. In
short, the classification should ideally be neither under-inclusive nor
over-inclusive with respect to the purpose to be accomplished.
21
Two general types of difficulty have marked judicial attempts to
review the reasonableness of classifications. The first of these has been
a failure to identify accurately the purpose for which a given classifi-
cation is established. Unless the purpose be identified, it is impossible
to determine whether the classification established and the treatment
accorded to persons within it are reasonably calculated to effect legis-
lative and adminstrative intent.
:7Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 145 (1940).
n8Yick Wo v. Hopkins, i18 U. S. 356 (1886); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678
(1888); Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 2oo (1927).
"Patstone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138 (1914); Crane v. Johnson, 242 U. S. 339
(i9i6); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141 (1940); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 536
(1942).
-'See infra at 189-192.
1 For more exhaustive analysis of the logical alternatives available to classi-
fiers, see Tussman and ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws (1949) 37 Calif.
L. Rev. 344-356.
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Two recent opinions, Avery v. Georgia2 2 and Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc. v. Missouri,23 offer conspicuous examples of this difficulty.24 In the
Aveiy case, Georgia's method of selecting juries by printing the names
of eligible Negroes on yellow tickets and those of whites on white
tickets was struck down as a "prima facie case of discrimination."2 5
While constituting only 14 per cent of the eligible jurors in Fulton
County, Georgia, Negoes accounted for over 5 per cent of those on the
jury list during the preceding year. Since "proportional representa-
tion of races on a jury is not a constitutional requisite," 26 it might
reasonably be concluded that the Georgia selection system was designed
to create juries "generally representative of the community." 27 If
this was the State's purpose-and there is no clear showing of any
other-then the classification would appear to be a reasonable one.
A Missouri statute requiring employers to give their employees
four hours off on election day without loss of pay was tested in the
Day-Brite case. "The classification of voters so as to free employees
from the domination of employers," said the Court, "is an attempt to
deal with an evil to which the one group has been exposed. The need
for that classification is a matter of legislative judgment... and does
not amount to a denial of equal protection under the laws." 28 If it can
be assumed the statute was aimed at preventing employers from in-
terfering with the political attitudes of their workers, then the classi-
cation seems reasonably well related to its purpose. If, however, the
Act was intended primarily to encourage larger turnouts of voters,
then the classification is under-inclusive since it imposes a financial
burden on one group, employers, and not on another, self-employed
persons and employees. Once again, the validity of a classification is
seen to depend on a prior identification of purpose.
Discovery of legislative purpose is a logically necessary prerequi-
site to the testing of classifications. Unfortunately, judicial recognition
of this task has frequently been marred by slipshod performance.
Where problems of equality are involved, identification of purpose
remains a major area for judicial improvement.
2345 U. S. 559 (1953).
0342 U. S. 421 (1952).
24See also Buck v. Bell, 247 U. S. 200 (1927); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 536
(194.2); Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633 (1948); Takahashi v. Fish and Game
Commission, 334 U. S. 410 (1948).
' 345 U. S. 559, 562 (1953).
''Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282, 286 (195o).
nSmith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 131 (1940).
93 42 U. S. 421, 425 (1952) (italics mine).
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A second difficulty which has plagued the Court is its attempts to
evaluate the reasonableness of classifications has been that of over or
under-inclusive coverage. Once legislative purpose has been ascer-
tained, it must next be determined whether all persons similarly
situated with respect to that purpose, and only such persons, have
been accorded the treatment specified by statute. The Japanese evacua-
tion cases represent classic examples of over-inclusive classification.
To prevent sabotage of our war industries, the federal government
in 1942 removed all Japanese-Americans from the west coast.29 Little
insight is required to recognize that most of the Japanese-Americans
thus singled out for special treatment did not possess the trait-po-
tentiality for sabotage-which the law was designed to control. Hence,
the classification was over-inclusive.
3 0
Under-inclusive classification offers even greater difficulties. In
cases involving tax laws,3 ' public utilities, 32 and regulations of busi-
ness 33 the Court has usually been willing to uphold classifications even
though they did not include all those similarly situated with respect
to the purpose of the law. Administrative difficulty in reaching simul-
taneously all who require special attention has been the usual justifica-
tion for this tolerance. Granting such difficulties, it would seem
reasonable to require some compelling reason or reasons for over-
riding the demands of sound classification. The consequences of failure
to justify adequately an under-inclusive classification emerge with
striking clarity in the recent case of Salsburg v. Maryland.34
In issue there was a Maryland law permitting admission of evi-
dence secured by illegal search and seizure for prosecution of cer-
tain gambling misdemeanors in Anne Arundel County, but prohibit-
ing the admission of such evidence in like prosecutions in all but two
other counties, and, even in Anne Arundel County, prohibiting its
admission in prosecutions for many other misdemeanors.3 5 Observing
that "the Equal Protection Clause relates to equality between persons
as such, rather than between areas," 36 the Court concluded that the
2'Hirabayashi v. United States, 32o U. S. 8i (1943); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U. S. 214 (1944).
3'See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 3a8 U. S. 356 (1886).
"Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 (1887); Bell's Gap R. R. Comp. v. Penn-
sylvania, 134 U. S. 232 (189o).
=Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. May, 194 U. S. 267 (19o3); Nashville C. & St. L. Ry.
v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362 (1940).
mCentral Lumber Comp. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157 (1912); Tigner v. Texas,
310 U. S. 141 (1940).
3'346 U. S. 545 (1954).
17Md. Ann. Code (Flack ig5i) Art. 35 § 5.
3346 U. S. 545, 551 (x954).
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classification was reasonable, even though it might be "illogical" and
"unscientific." The ruling principle here, it was argued, is the same as
that which upheld a Missouri law3- 7 "requiring that in the city of St.
Louis and four counties appeals be made to the St. Louis Court of
Appeals, whereas appeals made elsewhere in that State must be
directed to the Supreme Court of Missouri." 38
The purpose of the Maryland law was quite clearly improved
efficiency in the apprehension of gamblers. Since some gamblers were
subject to its provisions and others were not, the classification is under-
inclusive. The Court attempts to justify this by equating Missouri's
classification-involving a minor matter of judicial administration-
with one which deprives certain state residents of a fundamental
right. This represents a curious departure from past judicial demands
that classifications involving human and civil rights require a stronger
justification than do all others.3 9 No compelling reasons were presented
for restricting the use of illegally seized evidence to the Courts of
three counties. The alleged recent increase of gambling activity in
Anne Arundel County offers no basis for the contention that gamblers
were more difficult to detect and capture there than elsewhere in the
State.
B. Legislative and Administrative Purpose
Identification of legislative purpose and measurement of the re-
lationship between classification and purpose do not exhaust the ju-
dicial tasks posed by the Equal Protection Clause. Still to be con-
sidered is the validity of legislative and/or administrative purpose.
Is the classification motivated by a "discriminatory" intent? Is the
purpose, regardless of its motivation, one which is "absolutely" or
"substantively" prohibited?
i. Discriminatory Purpose
Clearly enunciated in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,40 Truax v. Raich4l and
Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission,42 and confirmed by dicta
in Korematsu v. United States43 and Kotch v. Board of River Pilot
"NMissouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22 (1880).
"346 U. S. 545, 551 (1954).
"See particularly Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633 (1948); Takahashi v. Fish
and Game Comm., 334 U. S. 410 (1948); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948); Hurd
v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24 (1948).
40118 U. S. 356, 374 (1886).
"239 U. S. 33, 41 (1915)-
"-334 U. S. 410, 420 (1948)-
"323 U. S. 214, 216 (1944).
19 5
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Commissioners4 is the notion that classificatory schemes may not be
motivated purely by "antagonism," "hostility" or "prejudice." If the
imposition of special burdens on a limited class of persons is occasioned
primarily by legislative or administrative enmity toward that class,
then the classification must fall as a denial of equal protection. Ju-
dicial vigilance in this area has been directed exclusively to the inter-
diction of racial and religious prejudice; 45 hostility toward economic,
political, and social groups, although frequently a motivating factor
in legislative action, has never been exposed and struck down on equal
protection grounds.
The racial segregation cases, from Plessy v. Ferguson4O to Brown v.
Board of Education,47 present a curious exception to this line of de-
velopment.48 While the "separate but equal" doctrine compromised
many aspects of equality, its most glaring deficiency resided in a
failure to recognize that segregation is, in most instances, discrimina-
torily motivated. Indeed, prohibition on the intermingling of races
for educational purposes is the most stringent and uncompromising
demand of anti-Negro prejudice in the United States. Consistent ap-
plication of the "discriminatory purpose" doctrine would have in-
validated most segregative practices. 4
9
It is surprising that the doctrine of discriminatory purpose has en-
joyed even a limited application. Individual legislators and adminis-
trators are seldom, if ever, motivated by a single purpose; legislative
bodies never are. Moreover, the distinction between an intent to regu-
late what is reasonably apprehended to be an evil and an intent un-
reasonably to discriminate against specified groups is an exceedingly
"33o U. S. 552, 556 (1947)-
"Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their
very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine
of equality. For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on
race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection." Hirabayashi v.
United States, 32o U. S. 81 (1943).
'163 U. S. 537 (1896).
7347 U. S. 483 (1954).
*See also Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938) -
"aJudicial reluctance to expose and overturn discriminatively motivated seg-
regation schemes is most dramatically illustrated in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938); and McLauren v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S.
637 (1950), where the educational segregation practices of two states were struck
down, although the separate but equal doctrine was explicitly upheld. Since the
facilities afforded the two races in both these situations were, for all practical
purposes, equal, the Court could reasonably eliminate the practices in question
only by finding a discriminatory intent or by relinquishing "separate but equal."
It is interesting to note that a unanimous court chose the latter course in Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954).
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difficult one to draw. What is prejudice? Can it be distinguished from
the more tolerable varieties of opposition and disagreement? Al-
though these questions appear to be nearly unanswerable, it is never-
theless true that a complete and systematic application of the egali-
tarian principle requires recognition and regulation of authoritarian,
elitist attitude patterns. Such patterns have been correlated, although
to an as yet unmeasured extent, with the growth of unequal and dis-
criminatory action on both the private and public levels.0° Neither
courts nor legislatures can continue to ignore the critical role of emo-
tional attitudes in the formulation of public policy. The discrimina-
tory purpose doctrine, though indecisively and inconsistently applied,
represents an emergent effort to cope with the consequences of inter-
group hostility. We shall return to it and to the possibilities for its re-
finement and expansion in the concluding section of this article.
2. Forbidden Purpose
Although a given classification may not be motivated by a dis-
criminatory intent, its purpose may be invalidated on other grounds.
The restrictive covenant cases suggest that the Equal Protection Clause
may be used to guarantee certain substantive rights51-rights which
have previously been protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Under Due Process, some rights to liberty
and property have been viewed as absolute and inviolable. Attempts to
infringe them, even when accompanied by the usual procedural
safeguards, have thus been invalidated. Similarly, Shelley v. Kraem-
mer52 stands for the proposition that the right of minority races to own
and enjoy property wherever they wish will be protected positively
under the Equal Protection Clause. Attempts to segregate the living
accommodations of different races, although representing a classifica-
tion which is reasonably related to what the Court has apparently ac-
cepted as a non-discriminatory purpose, have consequently been over-
turned.
Thus far, only the ownership of property has been included among
those substantive rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause.
Prior to the long-awaited opinion in Brown v. Board of Education53
however, the educational segregation cases were linked by a rhetorical
rWSee Adorno and others, The Authoritarian Personality (1950).
nShelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24 (1948).
r334 U. S. 1 (1948).
0347 U. S. 483 (1954).
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thread which promised a further expansion of the substantive equality
doctrine. Initially stated in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada54 and
explicitly reiterated in the Sweatt and McLauren opinions 5 was the
proposition that the right to equality is a "personal one." "It was as
an individual that (petitioner) was entitled to the equal protection
of the laws, and the State was bound to furnish him within its borders
facilities for legal education substantially equal to those which the
State there afforded for persons of the white races." 56 Are "personal
rights" and "individual rights" equivalent to "absolute" or "sub-
stantive" rights? With the exception of the restrictive convenant
cases, 57 the Equal Protection Clause has heretofore been concerned
primarily with the relationship which ought to obtain between in-
dividuals; it has imported a collective and relative view of individual
conditions. The enjoyment of a "personal right," however, does not
depend upon the circumstances and condition of others. It, like free-
dom of press or assembly, may not be denied merely because others
have suffered a similar deprivation. In this sense it may reasonably be
viewed as an "absolute" or "substantive" right.
Since the "substantive" thread linking together certain of the
earlier segregation cases appears to have been severed by Brown v.
Board of Education, the concept of substantive equality remains as an
embryonic facet of equal protection doctrine. It has in no way been
diminished, however, as a potential common denominator for lib-
erty and equality.
C. Requirements of Equality
Reasonable classification, purity of motive, and to a minor ex-
tent guarantees for the protection of basic rights- these represent the
minimum demands of the Equal Protection Clause in its present state
of development. Essentially the Clause has played a negative role,
functioning as a legislative standard and as an obstacle to the creation
of inequalities by government action. Inequities resulting from in-
dividual differences and from the clash of private interests, have,
with minor exceptions, been largely beyond its reach. Moreover, the
clause has been little used as a positive device for promoting similarity
of condition, equality of opportunity, and the full enjoyment of
r"o5 U. S. 337 (1938).
r'339 U. S. 629 (1950); 339 U. S. 637 (1950).
5'305 U. S. 337, 351 (1938).
"7Supra, note 51.
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substantive rights. In turning next to current doctrinal elaborations
of liberty, we are met with implications which if fully realized
would alter this emphasis and would establish liberty and equality
as synonymous guarantors of minimum conditions for individual well-
being.
II. Liberty
The development of American political and constitutional thought
has cast the idea of liberty into two molds, one negative, the other
positive. Negatively, liberty consists in a system of constitutional limi-
tations on majority rule. The Bill of Rights constitutes our most ex-
plicit and definitive statement of this concept. Government may not
act if in so doing it denies the free expression of opinion or belief,
intrudes unreasonably upon privacy, employs improper procedures in
trying and convicting criminals, restricts unjustly freedom of locomo-
tion, invades without compensation the ownership and enjoyment of
property, creates a system of peonage or slavery, etc. Moreover, the
rights protected by these limitations have frequently been held to
derive from natural as well as from constitutional authority.58 "It
must be conceded," wrote Justice Miller in 1874, "that there are
rights in every free government beyond control of the State."59 For
example, "... the right of acquiring and possessing property and
having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and inalienable
rights of man."60 The concept of Due Process of Law was defined for
Justice Cardozo by "those fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions."61
Defined positively, liberty consists in those rights which promote
full citizen participation in government and in the decision-making
process-the right to vote, to hold office, and the right of the majority
to rule. When fully implemented, these rights in turn provide the
channels for expanding and guaranteeing the conditions necessary for
full enjoyment of still other rights-the right to choose one's livelihood
and to enjoy a decent standard of living, the right to full opportunity
for individual development, the right to marry, raise a family, to move
freely about, etc. While many of these rights may not be guaranteed
in the narrow constitutional sense, all of them are and have ever been
insistent and fundamental demands of a free people. That we have
r5See Corwin, The Debt of American Constitutional Law to Natural Law Con-
cepts 0950) 25 Notre Dame Law. 258.
r'Citizen's Saving and Loan Association v. Topeka, 2o Wall. 655, 662 (U. S. 1874).
OVan Horn's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304, 310 (U. S. 1795).
OPalko v. Connecticut, 3o2 U. S. 319, 328 (1937).
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recognized them in some sense as rights is attested to by the ever-
expanding volume of state and federal legislation designed to pro-
mote the morals, health, safety and well-being of all the people.
In its positive aspect liberty has much in common with equality.
Both are oriented toward the positive promotion of those conditions
necessary for full and equal enjoyment of the fruits of social organiza-
tion; both are directed toward the elimination of those conditions
which, while tolerating the continued existence of abstract rights for
all, nevertheless frustrate effectively the active enjoyment of them.
Thus, both equality and positive liberty are concerned with oppor-
tunity, with a just distribution of the wealth and power of society,
and with the road-blocks to individual self-fulfillment so frequently
resulting from the clash of private interest groups. Both require
ideally that when large groups of people become the object of either
public or private action, those who are similarly situated shall be
similarly treated, and that the purpose of such action shall be legiti-
mate-shall aid in the realization of human strivings rather than in
their frustration.
A study of those post-war decisions involving individual rights re-
veals a slow, indecisive, yet clearly discernable shift away from the
idea of negative liberty and toward that of positive liberty. The Court
is demonstrating an increasing tendency to construe liberty in terms
of the doctrines formerly associated with equality generally and with
the Equal Protection Clause specifically. Stated more accurately, the
interpretation of liberty in equal protection terms contributes signif-
icantly to the removal of those conditions blocking the full and equal
enjoyment of positive liberty and provides the tools and the frame-
work for any expansion of those liberties which society may wish to
make. It is in this sense that we may speak of the merging concepts of
liberty and equality. The extent of this merger requires a detailed
analysis of some recent civil liberties cases.
For purposes of convenience post-war civil liberties decisions may
be organized and treated under three headings: i) cases in which
rights are distinguished from privileges; 2) First Amendment cases;
3) Labor cases.
A. Right v. Privilege
"It has been held repeatedly and consistently," announced Judge
Prettyman in Bailey v. Richardson "that Government employ is not
'property' and that it is not a contract. We are unable to perceive how
it could be 'liberty.' Certainly it is not 'life.' ... the due process clause
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does not apply to the holding of Government office." 0 2 Substitute for
the phrase "government employ" such activities as teaching school,
running for public office, or engaging in political campaigning, and the
result will be a concise summary of the Court's position in what we
shall term the "constitutional privilege" cases. In these cases certain
activities of private individuals were claimed to be, or to involve the
exercise of, unabridgeable rights. Among these activities were: i) politi-
cal campaigning;63 2) teaching school;64 3) federal employment; 65 4)
state employment; 6 5) running for public office; 67 6) utilizing federal
collective bargaining machinery; s 7) operating a private charitable
organization. 69
In each instance the Court denied to the activity in question the
status of a right and either asserted or implied that each was a privi-
lege, the exercise of which might legitimately be conditioned upon
the meeting of reasonable requirements laid down by public author-
ity.70 "It is ... clear," announced Justice Minton in the Adler case,
"that they have no right to work for the State in the school system on
their own terms .... They may work for the school system on the rea-
sonable terms laid down by the proper authorities of New York." 71
Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Garner v. Board of Public Works,
was emphatic that "The Constitution does not guarantee public em-
ployment. City, State and Nation may assure themselves of fidelity to
the very presumption of our scheme of government on the part of
those who seek to serve it."72 Finally, this statement from United Pub-
lic Workers v. Mitchell: "If, in their judgment (President and Congress),
"Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. (2d) 46, 57 (1950).
"United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 33o U. S. 75 (1947); Oklahoma v. Civil
Service Comm'n, 35o U. S. 127 (1947).
"Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485 (1952).
"Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. (2d) 46 (195o).
"Garner v. Los Angeles Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716 (1951); Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952).
"Gerende v. Board of Supervisors (Per Curiam), 341 U. S. 56 (1951)-
"Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 (195o).
"Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 (1951).
0OSupra, note 65; but Cf. supra, note 68 at 389-39o. "The Board has argued...
that ... its sole sanction is the withdrawal from noncomplying unions the 'privi-
lege' of using its facilities.... We are... neither free to treat Sec. 9(b) (of the non-
Communist oath provision of the Taft-Hartley Act) as if it merely withdraws a
privilege gratuitously granted by the Government, nor able to consider it a licens-
ing statute prohibiting those persons who do not sign the affidavit from holding
union office. The practicalities of the situation place the proscriptions of Sec. 9(b)
somewhere between those two extremes." (Italics mine)
7342 U. S. 485, 492 (1952).
"341 U. S. 716, 724-25 (1951).
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efficiency may be best obtained by prohibiting active participation by
classified employees in politics as party officers or workers, we see no
Constitutional objection."73
Failing to establish their activities as rights, petitioners turned to
more generally recognized liberties which they asserted were in whole
or in part, directly or indirectly, involved in the regulated activities.
Among these were claimed to be the right to freedom of expression,
as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 74 the right to
Due Process of Law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
75
the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel and to jury trial,70 and the
right to be free from bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. 7? These
claims were also given short shrift. Due process, jury trial, and pro-
hibitions of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder were designed to
afford proper safeguards to those faced with possible criminal punish-
ment by the State. Denial of the various privileges involved in these
cases because of a failure to meet the conditions laid down for their
exercise was not, said the Court, punishment. "Mere dismissal from
government service," for example, "is not punishment."75 In some of
these decisions, however, it was held that adequate procedural safe-
guards had been observed or it was assumed that they would be.70 With
respect to freedom of expression it was determined either that a minor
but justifiable invasion of the right had occurred,80 or that there was,
in fact, no infringement.8 '
Hence, the exercise of some rights, as well as what are here called
privileges, may be conditioned upon the fulfillment of reasonable re-
quirements. But what are reasonable requirements? Involvement in
"subversive" activity or knowing membership in "subversive" organiza-
tions is clearly recognized in all these opinions as a reasonable basis
for public action. It was made equally clear, however, that not every
condition which government decides to impose will meet the reason-
ableness test. To place conditions upon the exercise of a privilege is
"330 U. S. 75, 99 (1947)-
I'Supra, notes 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69.
"Adler v. Board of Education, Bailey v. Richardson, Gerende v. Board of Super-
visors, Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath.
"Bailey v. Richardson.
,Bailey v. Richardson, Communications Ass'n v. Douds, Garner v. Los Angeles
Board, Wieman v. Updegraff.
"'Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. (2d) 46, 55 (195o).
"Adler v. Board of Education; Garner v. Board of Public Works.
"Communications Ass'n v. Doud&
"'Adler v. Board of Education; Bailey v. Richardson; Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath.
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to establish a classification. Classifications so established, averred the
Court, must bear a reasonable relationship to some legitimate public
purpose. In short, the demand for equal treatment under the laws is the
doctrinal upshot of these cases.
In upholding the Hatch Act limitations upon one class of persons-
federal employees and certain state employees-and upon no others, the
"decisive principle" was noted to be "the power of Congress, within
reasonable limits, to regulate, so far as it might deem necessary, the
Political conduct of its employees."8 2 The Court found that a denial
to public employees of "an active role in political management or po-
litical campaigns" was such a reasonable regulation. "Many classifica-
tions of government employees have been accustomed to work in
politics-national, state, or local-as a matter of principle, or to assure
their tenure. Congress may reasonably desire to limit party activity
of federal employees so as to avoid a tendency toward a one-party
system."s3
While the Hatch Act was conceded to have a legitimate purpose,
the Court hastened to add that classifications stemming from a discrim-
inatory purpose would be invalid. "None would deny ... that Congress
may not 'enact a regulation providing that no Republican, Jew or
Negro shall be appointed to federal office, or that no federal employee
shall attend Mass or take any active part in missionary work'. ' 84
Finally, the contention was entertained, but rejected, that the classi-
fication was over-inclusive-that Congress had gone further than nec-
essary in prohibiting political activity to persons in non-policy, indus-
trial jobs. Distinction between policy and non-policy positions and
between administrative and industrial jobs were held to be "differences
in detail-which are for Congress rather than for the Courts" to de-
cide.8 5
The Hatch Act decisions, then, were rested squarely on equal
protection grounds. The purpose of the classification was indenti-
fled, found to be non-discriminatory, and accepted as valid. The classi-
fication itself was discovered to be reasonably related to its purpose
and to be neither under nor over-inclusive.
It is similarly clear that the President's Loyalty Review Program
was sustained on equal protection grounds86 After rejecting the
claims that the Loyalty Order denied to government employees their
"United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 350 U. S. 75, 96 (1947).
WId. at loo.
aid. at ioo.
5Id. at 101-10 - .
88Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. (2d) 46 (1950).
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rights under the First, Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the Circuit Court
concluded that the Executive is restricted in the selection and dis-
missal of federal employees only by the requirements of reasonable
classification and non-discriminatory purpose. He may discriminate for
"political reasons." Neither he nor Congress, however, could require
"that no Republican, Jew or Negro be appointed to public office."
Such a classification would "have no discernible bearing upon quali-
fication for office," and "would be purely arbitrary and capricious in
the most obnoxious meaning of those words."87 Dismissal of govern-
ment workers suspected of disloyalty to the United States was held
to constitute reasonable discrimination, since the President is con-
stitutionally charged with the responsibility for the "ability, integrity,
and loyalty of the personnel of the Executive Branch."88
Conditions upon state employment or the holding of state offices
similar to those imposed on federal employees under the President's
Loyalty Program were faced by the Supreme Court in four post-war
cases.8 9 In three of these a nearly identical loyalty oath was involved.
Employees (or candidates for office, in the Maryland case) were re-
quired to swear that they did not advocate, nor did they belong to
organizations which advocated, a forceful overthrow of government.
Again rejecting First and Fifth Amendment claims, the Court's de-
cision was couched in equal protection terms. Loyalty oaths were
deemed to constitute reasonable conditions upon public employment
and hence dismissal for failure to sign is legitimate. But Justice Frank-
furter, concurring in the Garner case, carefully spelled out the usual
equal protection requirements for employment classification. ". . it
does not follow that because the Constitution does not guarantee a
right to public employment, a city or a State may resort to any scheme
for keeping people out of such employment.... unreasonable discrim-
ination, if avowed in formal law, wbuld not survive constitutional
challenge. Surely, a government could not exclude from public em-
ployment members of a minority group merely because they are odious
to the majority." 90
While the imposition of a loyalty oath was viewed as a reasonable
condition upon public employment, dismissal for membership in a
subversive organization was seen in a different light. In the Garner and
87d. at 62-63.
sld. at 57.
8Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U. S. 56 (1951); Garner v. Los Angeles
Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716 (1951); Adler v. Board of Education, 342
U. S. 485 (1952); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952).
'034l U. S. 716, 725 (1951).
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Gerende cases the Court assumed that only those who knowingly be-
longed to such organizations would ,be severed from their jobs. Dis-
missal "of those who during their affiliation with a proscribed organ-
ization were innocent of its purpose" or "those who severed their
relation with any such organization when its character became appar-
ent,"9' was strongly implied to constitute an over-inclusive, and hence
an unreasonable classification. 92
This implication was made explicit in Wieman v. Updegraff where
Oklahoma's loyalty oath for state employees was overturned on grounds
that "association alone determines disloyalty and disqualification; it
matters not whether association existed innocently or knowingly. To
thus inhibit individual freedom of movement is to stifle the flow of
democratic expression and controversy at one of its chief sources....
Indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall
as an assertion of arbitrary power. The oath offends due process." 93
In short, an equal protection determinant-over-inclusive classifica-
tion-is here read into the Due Process Clause.
We turn finally to the non-Communist-oath provision of the Taft-
Hartley Act 94 as construed in Communication Association v. Douds.95
It was granted at the outset that the oath "exerted pressure upon labor
unions to deny positions of leadership to certain persons who are iden-
tified by particular beliefs and political affiliations," 96 and that the
First Amendment rights of union members and their officers are, to a
certain degree, thereby contravened. Classification based upon beliefs
and political affiliations was upheld as bearing a "reasonable relation
to the evil which the statute was designed to reach"9 7-the preven-
tion of political strikes designed to interrupt the free flow of com-
merce. Affiliational classification was justified by specific reference to
a number of equal protection decisions which upheld classifications
based upon alienage,98 ancestry,9 9 and business activity.100 "If accidents
11Id. at 723.
t 3Indeed, Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the Garner opinion, stated explicit-
ly that the oath could not be assumed to contain a scienter provision and that it
therefore represented an unreasonable classification. Id. at 727-728.
'344 U. S. 183, 191 (1952).
9161 Stat. 136, 146, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. III) §§ 141, 159(b), Amending the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. §§ 151 et seq.
'5339 U. S. 382 (1950).
6Id. at 39o.
971d. at 39o-391.
8Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392 (1927).
OHirabayashi v. United States, 32o U. S. 81 (1943).
20°Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U. S. 441 (1947).
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of birth and ancestry under some circumstances justify an inference
concerning future conduct, it can hardly be doubted that voluntary
affiliations and beliefs justify a similar inference." 101
But, may classifications built on beliefs and political affiliations be
allowed to invade First-Amendment rights? They may, the Court as-
sures us, if such rights are only partially and indirectly involved in
the regulated activity and if the class singled out for special treat-
ment (Communists) poses a substantial threat to the public interest.
The purpose of the law is not to suppress speech and opinion, but to
prevent politically-motivated strikes. If the purpose is valid and non-
discriminatory and the classification is reasonably related to it, the
regulation must stand.
That these cases pivot on equal protection considerations, although
the Clause itself is never invoked, seems clear enough. Equally evident
are the same inadequacies implicit in the Court's other attempts to
apply equal protection formulae. In the Hatch Act cases,102 for ex-
ample, an over-inclusive classification receives the Court's seal of ap-
proval. If the purpose of the Act is to "avoid a tendency toward a one
party system,"'103 then only federal employees who are in a position
to influence or coerce their co-workers require special regulation.
Were the limitation on political activity restricted to those in policy-
forming and higher administrative positions, the classification would
probably be a reasonable one. Inclusion of laborers, charwomen,
and minor technical assistants, however, extends the classification to
persons having little or no relationship to its purpose.
Judicial insistence in the State Loyalty Oath cases that "knowing"
membership in subversive organizations must be distinguished from
"innocent" membership is a defensible and accurate application of
classification doctrine. Unfortunately, the Court failed to exercise
equal vigilance in Adler v. Board of Education'0 4 where it found ac-
ceptable New York's requirement that knowing membership in a
subversive organization shall constitute prima facie evidence for dis-
qualification from the public school system. It is reasonable to pre-
sume, averred Justice Minton, that knowing membership in an or-
ganization implies acceptance of the organization's purpose. Such
a presumption is, of course, a flagrant example of over-inclusive clas-
sification. Where ideological and political association is involved,
'°339 U. S. 382, 391-392 (1950).
ulSupra, note 85.
'033o U. S. 75, 100 (1947).
1"342 U. S. 485 (1952).
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individuals are seldom, if ever, impelled by a single common motive.
A plurality of frequently conflicting purposes is a commonplace
in American political organizations. To assert that all members of or-
ganizations infiltrated by Communists have a "subversive" purpose is to
uncritically lump the innocent with the guilty. Many members of
such organizations have frequently retained membership for purposes
of expelling Communist influence and reorienting the group. A vig-
orous and systematic application of the concept of reasonable classi-
fication would effectively frustrate the trend toward "guilt by associa-
tion." 05
The decision in the Douds case is an excellent example of under-
inclusive classification. If the purpose of the Taft-Hartley Act's Non-
Communist Oath is the prevention of politically-inspired strikes, then
a regulation requiring all labor leaders to forswear them would
constitute a means reasonably related to the end. It can hardly be
assumed, however, that only Communist leaders will call strikes for
political reasons.
The repeated application of equal protection doctrine in these
cases, halting and indecisive though it may have been, casts consider-
able doubt on the contention that partisan political activity, govern-
ment employment, public office holding, etc. are conditioned privi-
leges rather than rights. Although regulation of them does not infringe
the traditional negative liberties of free speech and assembly, private
property and contract rights, or due process, the Court strongly implies
that such regulation must meet the demands of equality. These ac-
tivities, then, are positive rights requiring the equal protection of the
laws.
B. First Amendment Cases.
Down to the end of World War I the First Amendment was a rela-
tively insignificant factor in American constitutional development. The
thirty years between 1919 and 1949, in contrast, witnessed a veritable
flood of decisions dealing with freedom of expression. In the period
1943-49 alone, forty-one such cases were decided.106 The dominant
canon of construction throughout most of these thirty years is generally
"--The decision in Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath represents yet
another failure to strike down an obviously over-inclusive classification. Although
the procedures used by the Attorney General in drawing up his list of subversive
organizations were mildly rebuked, the Court failed to overturn his classification
as arbitrary and devoid of ascertainable defining characteristics.
' For a thorough survey of First Amendment cases from igig to the present,
see Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger from Schenk to Dennis (1952) 52 Col. L.
Rev. 313.
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believed to have been Justice Holmes' renowned "clear and present
danger" rule. However, little support can be found for this view. In
the decade 1919-193o only one majority opinion, Schenk v. United
States,0 7 and six dissents' 08 were rested on clear and present danger
grounds. In the following decade the doctrine appears in only one
majority opinion and one dissent. 0 9 While numerous opinions have
pivoted on clear and present danger since 194o, a greater and steadily
increasing number have been grounded on two competing doctrines:
"reasonable basis" 110 and "prior restraint.""' Even in the restricted
area to which it previously applied, and even as a "pervasive at-
mospheric pressure" 112 on free speech decisions, clear and present
danger in the post-war period has all but disappeared. The paramount
doctrinal thread tying together First Amendment cases since 1947 has
been the concept of equal treatment under the law. Both the "reason-
able basis" and "prior restraint" tests are, at bottom, guarantees of
reasonable classification and legitimate purpose. Although the idea of
equality does not emerge from these cases with the uniform clarity seen
in the "constitutional privilege" cases, a discernible trend is none-
theless evident.
For purposes of analysis, post-war First Amendment decisions may
be divided into three groups: (i) license cases, (2) nuisance cases, (3)
cases pertaining to freedom of the public forum. Labor cases touching
on free speech problems will be treated in a separate section.
i. License Cases
Local ordinances or practices for licensing the use of public fa-
cilities were tested in four recent decisions." 83 In all of them, local
licensing authorities had refused to religious organizations permits to
hold meetings on public property; in all, the licensing provisions as
"249 U. S. 47 (199)-
'03Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919); Schaefer v. United States, 251
U. S. 468 (1920); Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239 (1920); Gilbert v. Minnesota,
254 U. S. 325 (192o); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925); Whitney v. California,
274 U. S. 357 (1927)-
'°'Herndon v. Lowry, 3oi U. S. 242 (1937); Justice Brandeis dissenting in
Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U. S. 441 (935).
n1 See, for example, Minersville Sch6ol District v. Gobitis, 31o U. S. 586 (1940);
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941).
mlnfra, note 113.
'-"Supra, note io6 at 313.
u-Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S.
29o (1951); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67 (1953); Poulos v. New Hampshire,
345 U. S. 395 (1953)-
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applied were held to constitute a prior restraint on the free exercise of
speech and religion. In the absence of "narrowly drawn, reasonable
and definite standards for the officials to follow," stated Chief Justice
Vinson in Niemotko v. Maryland, "the license-issuing 'practice'" be-
comes "completely arbitrary and discriminatory."
114
Prior restraint is thus condemned, not on chronological grounds,
as it erroneously was in Near v. Minnesota, but because the classifi-
cations established by licensing authorities-the determination of who
may and who may not speak-are likely to be arbitrary and discrimi-
natory; such classifications are not presumed to bear any reasonable
relationship to a valid, non-discriminatory purpose. Prohibition on
prior restraint here becomes a demand for equality under the law.
That the purpose of these licensing schemes, as demonstrated by
their administration, was discriminatorily motivated is evident from
Chief Justice Vinson's remark that permits were denied in the Niemot-
ho case "because of the City Council's dislike for or disagreement with
the (Jehovah's) Witnesses or their views."" 15 Prejudiced and hostile
motives, he asserted, are a denial of the "right to equal protection
of the laws" which "in the exercise of those freedoms of speech and
religion protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, has a
firmer foundation than the whims or personal opinions of a local
governing body."116
Insofar as the licensing schemes in the Kunz, Fowler and Poulos
cases were held to constitute a prior restraint, all of them turned on
equal protection considerations. Justice Douglas, speaking for the
Court in Fowler v. Rhode Island, held as determinative the fact that
"a religious service of Jehovah's Witnesses (was) treated differently
than a religious service of other sects.... This (is) a discrimination
which we (hold) to be barred by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.""27
Justice Frankfurter's contribution to the casting of First Amend-
ment rights in an equal protection mold should not go unnoticed. Con-
curring in the Fowler and Niemotko cases, he stoutly maintained that
the licensing ordinances there involved should be tested by the Equal
Protection Clause rather than by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment."18 After an exhaustive survey of prior decisions in-
"'340 U. S. 268, 273 (1951).
11d. at 272.
uLoc, cit.
'17245 U. S. 67, 69 (1953).
u81d. at 70; 340 U. S. 268, 284 (1951).
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volving limitations on First Amendment rights, he concluded that re-
view of each attempted regulation requires a balancing of the right to
freedom of expression against such considerations as "the interest deem-
ed to require the regulation of speech," the type of regulation used,
"the mode of speech to be regulated" and the "place where the regu-
lated speaking is to take place."'119 Regulation, in short, must meet
the demands of reasonable classification.
2. Nuisance Cases
To what extent may the manner or mode of speech be regulated?
May sound-amplification devices and mobile advertising displays be
entirely prohibited? May they be allowed to operate over widespread
public objection that they invade the right to privacy? In three out of
four post-war nuisance cases the Court answered the latter two ques-
tions affirmatively. 120 In Saia v. New York the discriminatory applica-
tion of Lockport, New York's loudspeaker licensing ordinance was
overturned. Finding that a lack of standards for the exercise of ad-
ministrative discretion in the issuing of licenses again constituted
a prior restraint on speech, the opinion proceeded to emphasize the
unreasonable discrimination implicit in such administrative behavior.
"Loud-speakers are today indispensable instruments of effective pub-
lic speech. The sound truck has become an accepted method of po-
litical campaigning. Must a candidate for governor or the Con-
gress . . prove to the satisfaction of (an) official that his noise will
not be annoying to people?"'12' Thus, although a "narrowly drawn"
regulation may be acceptable, the Lockport ordinance amounts to an
unreasonable classification.
In the Kovacs case the discriminatory application of loudspeaker
licenses against religious minorities was unavailable as a hook on
which to hang an equal protection interpretation of First Amendment
rights. Trenton, New Jersey's ordinance, in effect, prohibited abso-
lutely the use of sound amplification trucks on the streets.122 This
drastic treatment of an entire class of communication devices, never-
nO34o U. S. 268, 282 (1951).
'-Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. .558 (1947); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1948);
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U. S. 1o6 (1948); Public Utilities Comm'n
v. Pollack, 343 U. S. 451 (1952).
'21334 U. S. 558, 561-562 (1948).
=-Although the ordinance purported to prohibit only sound trucks emitting
"loud and raucous" noises, the latter phrase was apparently interpreted by appli-
cation to cover all sound trucks operating at an ordinary number of decibles. 336
U. S. 77, 79 (1948).
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theless, was justified as a needed protection of "privacy," "tranquility"
and the smooth flow of "traffic."' 123 The First Amendment "is not
enough to call forth constitutional protection for what those charged
with public welfare reasonably think is a nuisance."'
124
In upholding New York City's prohibition on "rented advertising
vehicles" the Court sustained a similar outright interdiction of a
communication media. 125 Two issues were presented here: Does a
prohibition on the use of mobile advertising violate First Amendment
rights? In limiting the prohibition to rented signs has the Equal Pro-
tection Clause been breached? The Court employed an equality
formula in answering both questions. Free speech has not been im-
properly invaded since regulation of advertising vehicles is "reasonably
related" to the "safety of the public in the use of the streets."' 26 The
Equal Protection Clause has similarly suffered no violation, "since
local authorities may well have concluded that those who advertise
their own wares on their trucks do not present the same traffic prob-
lem" as do advertisements on rented vehicles.127 In a concurring opin-
ion Justice Jackson insisted that both problems should be attacked
through the Equal Protection Clause. "Invalidation of a statute or an
ordinance on due process grounds," he asserted, "leaves ungoverned
and ungovernable conduct which many people find objectionable.
Invocation of the equal protection clause, on the other hand, does
not disable any governmental body from dealing with the subject at
hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation must have
a broader impact.... Courts can take no better measure to assure that
laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in application.'
128
Althoujh each of these regulations of the mode of speech was
tested in classification terms,120 little attention was given to the classi-
ficatory purpose or motive. Sound trucks and mobile signs are ef-
fective communication devices for persons and groups unable to afford
the costlier varieties of advertising. To what extent were these regula-
tions intended to enhance the position of well-established media such as
1'Id. at 87.
1 Id. at 88-89.
2-Railway Express Agency v. New York, S36 U. S. 1o6 (1948).
"Id. at iog.
' Id. at ixo.
128. at 112-113.
L"See also Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U. S. 451 (1952) in which
the Court upheld a finding of the District of Columbia Public Utilities Commis-
sion that Washington, D. C. bus lines be allowed to operate radio loudspeakers in
their vehicles. The Commission, it was concluded, did not act "arbitrarily" or
"capriciously."
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radio, newspapers, and television? The Court made no attempt to look
behind these ordinances for discriminatory intent. Similarly ignored
was the under-inclusive classification implicit in some of these ordi-
nances. If their purpose was the safeguarding of peace, quiet, tranquil-
ity, and traffic safety, then many nuisances-as billboards, neon signs,
store-front loudspeakers, or sound trucks, in the case of the New
York ordinance-might reasonably be included in the sweep of regu-
lation.
3. Freedom of the Forum
Perhaps the most controversial of the post-war civil rights decisions
have been those aimed at maintaining freedom of the public forum.
(Terminiello v. Chicago, Feiner v. New York, Beauharnais v. Illinois,
and Dennis v. United States.)13o Implicit in the speech regulated in
each of these cases, asserted the controlling authority, was a degree of
intransigent radicalism fundamentally opposed to free public dis-
cussion and aimed at the destruction of all opposing points of view. In
two of these instances (Beauharnais and Terminiello), the alleged
radicalism was cast in the mold of race-hate propaganda; in one
(Dennis), it appeared as an authoritarian political creed-Commun-
ism; in the fourth, both were involved.
In prohibiting certain types of speech for the purpose of protect-
ing equal access for all to the public forum, the Court undertook a
superficial analysis of the nature and consequences of radical and
authoritarian attitude patterns. Justice Jackson, dissenting in the
Terminiello case, characterized both the speaker and the hostile
mob gathered outside the hall as "local manifestation(s) of a worldwide
and standing conflict between two organized groups of revolutionary
fanatics. ... "' 31Continued tolerance of their strong-arm tactics, he
implied, will destroy faith in the democratic process and will force
the citizenry to choose between Communism and Fascism. Similarly,
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court in the Illinois case, equated
Beauharnais' anti-Negro utterances with group libel. Group libel, like
defamation of individuals, is "no essential part of any exposition of
ideas"' 32 and, referring to the recent history of race-riot in Illinois,
frequently leads to civil disturbance. Finally, former Chief Justice
Vinson, in the Dennis case, distinguished Communist doctrine from
ordinary, constitutionally-protected discussion on the grounds that it
constituted "advocacy" by a "highly organized conspiracy with rigidly
""337 U. S. 1 (1948); 340 U. S. 315 (1951); 343 U. S. 250 (1952); 341 U. S. 494 (1951).
13337 U. S. 1, 23 (1948).
m343 U. S. 250, 257 (1952).
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disciplined members subject to call when leaders ... felt that the
time had come for action. ... 133 Thus, it poses a threat to democratic
government and institutions.
It was asserted in all of these opinions that a certain class of radical
utterances, including race-hate propaganda and Fascist and Com-
munist doctrines, incorporate a trait-fanatical intent to destroy the
public forum-which the state may legitimately suppress. It was further
asserted that the state has selected a means and thereby established a
classification reasonably related to its purpose. Persons whose speech
incites a hostile mob to violence, in the Terminiello and Feiner cases;
persons whose speech portrays depravity, criminality, or contempt for
a racial or religious group, in the Beauharnais case; leaders of the
Communist party, in Dennis v. United States-all are said to rep-
resent classifications whose members possess the forbidden trait. Jus-
tice Frankfurter's observation in Beauharnais, then, succinctly cap-
sulizes the Court's equal-protection rationale in these cases: "It would
be out of bounds for the judiciary to deny the legislature a choice of
policy, provided it is not unrelated to the problem and not forbidden
by some explicit limitation on the State's power"-provided, that
is, the classification is reasonable and the purpose is valid.
3 4
Even granting that equal-protection formulae are best suited
for testing the situations involved in each of these situations, little
comfort can be derived from the manner in which such formulae are
applied. First, in no case was the regulatory purpose identified with
sufficient accuracy: that is, the forbidden trait was not dearly defined.
What is group-hate propaganda? Can it be distinguished from the
threats and accusations which have traditionally marked inter-group
relations in the United States? What is a Fascist doctrine, as distin-
guished from reaction in general; a Communist doctrine, as distin-
guished from collectivism? 135 second, to what extent were these regu-
lations themselves motivated by pure hostility or antagonism toward
the interdicted groups? Was a forbidden, discriminatory motive in-
volved in any of them? Third, both under and over-inclusive classifica-
tions are upheld in these opinions. In the Terminiello and Feiner cases,
the speaker, his cohorts, and the hostile audience all were similarly
situated with respect to the purpose of the law, in that it is assumed
all wished to destroy by force the exercise of free speech. Suppression
1 0341 U. S. 494, 511 (1951).
'343 U. S. 250, 262 (1952).
'--For a more extensive treatment of the constitutional problems posed by
ethnocentric utterances see Wilson, Beauharnais v. Illinois: Bulwark or Breach?
/1952) 14 Current Economic Comment 59.
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of the speaker and not the others is clearly an under-inclusive classi-
fication. In the Beauharnais case it is assumed that all who verbally
castigate racial and religious minorities are ethnocentrically oriented;
that is, that they are motivated by psychotic or neurotic prejudice.
This would appear to be an exaggeration and thus to constitute an
over-conclusive classification. Similarly, the contention in Dennis v.
United States that all leaders of the party-because they hold positions
of leadership-are devoted to a revolutionary purpose, would appear to
be an over-inclusive classification.
C. Labor Cases.
Is labor picketing exclusively or primarily a publicity and informa-
tional device, or does it merely include the speech aspect as one among
many characteristics? The first view-accepted by the Court in the
early forties-leads to a characterization of picketing activity as a
negative right (freedom of speech), properly to be protected by "sub-
stantive" or "absolute" doctrines. 3 6 The second view-presently ac-
cepted by the Court-justifies the imposition of reasonable limita-
tions on the "permissible contest open to industrial combatants.' 37
Under the aegis of this latter view liberty and equality have merged
within the area of labor picketing.
Two factors presently determine the nature and scope of permis-
sible restrictions on picketing: (i) the purpose of the restriction; (2)
the relationship between the regulation and its purpose. Picketing
restrictions are said to have a legitimate purpose if they seek to enjoin
conduct the continuance of which would frustrate the furtherance
of valid State policies as expressed either in legislative enactment 138
or judicial pronouncement. 139 A public policy is valid if it falls within
the scope of police power; that is, if it is reasonable. Regulations are
said to be related to their purpose if there is any basis in fact for a
legislative or judicial finding that the conduct sought to be enjoined
does interfere with the achievement of existent state policies. Such
"'Thornhill v. Alabama, 31o U. S. 88 (1940); Bakery and Pastry Drivers v.
Wohl, 315 U. S. 769 (1942); American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321
(1941); Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293 (1943).
lmGiboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Comp., 336 U. S. 490 (1949); Hughes v.
Superior Court, 339 U. S. 460 (195o); Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 339 U. S. 470
(195o); Building Service Union v. Gazzam, 339 U. S. 532 (195o).
llGiboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Comp., 336 U. S. 490 (1949).
"'Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 339 U. S. 470 (1950).
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a finding, of course, requires an economic and social evaluation of
competing forces and tendencies in the industrial sphere.
140
No longer to be equated with speech and, consequently, not to
be protected under the "clear and present danger" rule, labor picket-
ing has now become primarily a classification problem. Moreover, the
judicial tendency to avoid a close examination of legislative intent
where economic interests are involved has been confirmed and ex-
tended.' 4 ' Unfortunately, the ghost of Thornhill v. Alabama hovers
near enough to remind us that picketing-if not to be equated with
speech-nevertheless involves a large element of speech activity, and
that the purpose and intent of picketing restrictions may well merit
more careful judicial scrutiny.
III. Conclusion
What are the demands of equality as revealed by recent federal
decisions? (i) That those similarly situated be similarly treated; (2)
that classifications be reasonably related to their purpose; (3) that
legislative and administrative action not be motivated by hostility or
prejudice; (4) that legislative and administrative purpose be legitimate.
What are the demands of liberty? For the positive liberties, or "con-
ditioned privileges," as well as for the traditional negative freedoms,
they are rapidly becoming the identical requirements for reasonable
classification, non-discriminatory motive, and validity of purpose.
What are the consequences of this progressive identification of liberty
with equality? Although not yet clearly discernible, a number of trends
are beginning to emerge.
The application of equalitarian principles is no less indecisive,
inconsistent, and defective in the area of liberty than it has been
within the orbit of the Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, the judi-
cial tendency to tolerate under and over-inclusive classifications
and discriminatively motivated regulations has been strengthened by
a burgeoning of the judicial restraint doctrine. Impelled by Justice
Frankfurter's well-known solicitude for legislative experiment, and
goaded by Justice Jackson's fear of anarchy and civil disorder, the
Court has developed a noticeable reticence to enforce vigorously the
equal protection concept. Equality demands that when suppress-
ing inflamatory language local police officers demonstrate a pre-
ponderance of evidence rather than a mere suspicion that breach of
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latures to show that when organizations are labeled "subversive,"
all members of the organization share its purpose: equality requires
that all members of a proscribed class of public employees have the
taint which has been condemned. Ultimately, equality embodies a de-
mand for judicial judgments about legislative and administrative wis-
dom. Equal protection of the laws is a guarantee of positive rights;
it is not an open invitation to judicial abdication.
The alarm with which social scientists and philosophers have
viewed recent civil liberties decisions may be due as much to faulty
and hesitant application of equal protection doctrine as to judicial
rejection of such absolute formulae for the protection of individual
rights as clear and present danger. Certainly the grosser inadequacies
of these decisions-as guilt by association and effective suppression of
certain political beliefs-would be condemned by a more resolute use of
equal protection tests.
The long-range consequences of merging liberty with equality
are impossible to predict. There are implicit in this development, how-
ever, a number of potentialities which if actualized would occasion
significant changes in the American pattern of self-government. First,
the equal protection prohibition on prejudicially motivated classifi-
cations can provide an effective device for obstructing legislative at-
tempts to perpetuate and extend an unequal distribution of the wealth
and power of society. Similarly, equal access for all groups to the
mainstreams of opportunity can be better assured. Second, the im-
plicit notion that equality under law is a guarantee of certain positive
rights can provide a viable channel for public control over private
invasions of liberty. Illinois' regulation of race-hate propaganda in
an effort to reduce intergroup hostility is only one of the more dra-
matic illustrations of this possibility. Third, the stress placed by the
doctrine of equality on similarity of condition opens the way for
positive government action to equalize the status of individuals
and thereby to enhance the equal enjoyment of positive rights. The
equalitarian doctrine of liberty imposes no such absolute obstacles as
sanctity of contract or property on the advancement of community
well-being. The extent to which society is impelled to utilize the
tools provided by the combined doctrines of liberty and equality is, of
course, unpredictable. Formal notions of judicial construction, such
as equal protection of the laws, or due process of law, seldom if
ever operate as the motivating well-springs for social change.
We might, however, conclude with R. H. Tawney that "when
liberty is construed realistically, as implying not merely a minimum of
LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
civil and political rights, but securities that the economically weak will
not be at the mercy of the economically strong, and that the control of
those aspects of economic life by which all are affected will be amen-
able, in the last resort, to the will of all, a large measure of equality,
so far from being inimical to liberty, is essential to it.
'
"142
2$Supra, note i at 244.
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